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Cooperation
Trying To Make It Work In America
As we enter the 1990s, there can be little doubt that global and 
domestic nonunion competition have severely challenged traditional 
collective bargaining relationships in American industry. The market 
forces brought to bear on industry in the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s have led to important strategic choices by employers and unions, 
some adversarial and some cooperative. These choices may depict, on 
one hand, what some observers have called nothing less than the "trans 
formation of American industrial relations" (Kochan, Katz, and McKer- 
sie 1986), or what others, on the other hand, view as "nothing new under 
the sun" (Dunlop 1986). Whether one views ongoing changes as "noth 
ing new" or "a transformation," there are currently unprecedented 
widespread efforts at joint union-management activities designed to 
improve labor-management relations and company performance. Do 
these innovative joint activities, however, hallmark a shift away from 
historically adversarial relationships between unions and employers? 
Are industry and union leaders truly pioneering new and lasting part 
nerships, or are they merely going in circles, buying time and destined 
to return to a long tradition of adversarial relationships?
This study examines that fundamental question, although any defini 
tive answer at this time would be premature. The purpose of the study is 
to explore issues regarding the decision to cooperate, the success of 
cooperative efforts, and the problems that undermine these efforts. The 
analyses presented are based on a variety of secondary data sources, as 
well as data from nationwide surveys of plant managers, their local 
union leader counterparts, and executives of companies parent to the 
plants sampled.
This first chapter reviews the existing literature and sets the stage for
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the analyses that follow. Chapter 2 develops a general theoretical frame 
work, which broadly guides the subsequent analyses. Chapter 3 de 
scribes companywide labor relations strategies that have recently 
emerged and examines why some parties have embarked on cooperative 
relations and why just as many have not. In addition, the objectives and 
structure of joint programs, as reported by a sample of plant managers 
and local union leaders, are described. Chapter 4 examines how effec 
tive these joint efforts have been and identifies factors that appear to 
enhance or diminish their effectiveness. Chapter 5 addresses the under 
lying problems arising in the joint decisionmaking process that under 
mine the potential success and longevity of cooperative efforts. Finally, 
how the parties can go about resolving, avoiding, or minimizing the 
costly effects of these key problems is addressed in chapter 6. In that 
final chapter, implications for the union movement are also assessed.
I have chosen to avoid reporting many of the statistical details of my 
analyses. My purpose in doing so is to reach out to a wide audience of 
local and national union leaders, plant managers and company execu 
tives, and various policy makers wrestling with the issues at hand in 
practical ways. Although this wider audience needs and seeks informa 
tion and analyses that go beyond the wealth of reported case studies, 
reports, and testimonials, their interests are not in studying more aca 
demic methodological details and nuances of statistical modeling. 
Where I report the results of various statistical estimations, I have 
nevertheless adhered strictly to the results and hypothesized cause- 
effect relations. For readers especially interested in statistical details of 
the analyses, selected tables reporting the measurement and estimation 
of pertinent equations are provided in appendices to chapters 3 and 4. 
Nearly all the statistical estimations used in this study, furthermore, have 
been published recently or are in press in academic journals and hence 
available to the interested reader.
Review and Synthesis of the Literature
The literature on cooperation has grown rapidly in recent years, 
addressing both American and foreign experiences. Nearly all this
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literature is founded on single company and union case studies, reports, 
and testimonials. Recognizing that a detailed review of the literature is 
far beyond the intended scope of this study and that my specific purpose 
is to examine American industry experiences, I restrict my review to 
first providing a note on the limited early American experiments and, 
second, to a general synthesis of the reported potential benefits, costs, 
and problems associated with American cooperative activities. The 
review is further restricted to cooperative efforts between union repre 
sentatives and plant management that (a) are outside traditional contract 
negotiations and contract administration; (b) contain formalized mecha 
nisms for input from union representatives and/or the employees they 
represent into management decisions; and (c) are intended to improve 
company performance at the plant, either through direct efforts aimed at 
improving productivity, quality, efficiency, etc., and/or through indirect 
efforts aimed at improving employee well-being, job satisfaction, and/ 
or the labor-management relations climate.
Excluded, then, are cooperative problemsolving activities that might 
normally occur during the negotiation and the day-to-day administration 
of contracts. Although joint programs in health and safety, substance 
abuse, apprenticeship training, and many others can be seen as contrib 
uting to company performance and employee welfare, they are excluded 
from the present analysis. Their specific foci and restricted activities fall 
at the periphery of the present investigation and warrant separate analy 
ses. Also excluded are joint activities undertaken outside the plant or 
company, such as involvement in industry or communitywide joint 
activities or instances where the parties seek in concert to obtain trade 
protection from foreign competitors.
Except for labor-management committees, most joint activities are 
structured to elicit shop-floor participation. These programs, moreover, 
are very similar in structure and activity, regardless of program title. 
They revolve around team or group activities in which hourly and 
salaried employees put their heads together on a fairly regular basis. 
Their charge is to identify problems and opportunities for improvements 
in the workplace and, in turn, to develop plans for resolving problems or 
making improvements. Quality of Work Life (QWL) or Employee
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Involvement (El) programs do not differ substantially from quality 
circles, work teams, or employee involvement associated with gainshar- 
ing arrangements. The programs all appear to tackle issues surrounding 
productivity, product quality, efficiency, etc., and employee concerns 
about the work environment, the climate of labor-management rela 
tions, and overall job security. Most of these programs also have steering 
committees involving union officials, most restrict activities to subjects 
not governed by the labor contract, most are voluntary, and most provide 
training for team members.
These structural similarities do not imply that there are no differences 
among the team-based programs. The differences, however, have less to 
do with structure and purpose and more to do with: (a) the intensity of 
activity (e.g., the proportion of employees engaged in the activity, 
frequency of group meetings, the amount of team member training, and 
the extent of other joint programs); (b) the degree of emphasis placed on 
selected performance-related factors (quality, productivity, absen 
teeism, etc.); (c) the amount of autonomy and decisionmaking authority 
granted to teams; (d) the degree of union leader input (both in the design 
and facilitation of programs); and (e) whether or not there are financial 
incentives, either tied directly (i.e. gainsharing) or indirectly (i.e. profit 
sharing and stock ownership) to employee participation.
In spite of an extensive literature addressing cooperation, there are 
only a few surveys that begin to document the extent to which cooper 
ative activities have been undertaken. My 1986 nationwide survey of 
350 relatively large unionized manufacturing plants (described in chap 
ter 3) indicates that roughly 50 percent have established formalized joint 
programs of the kind described above. A 1983 Conference Board survey 
of approximately 400 large companies shows that 56 percent of union 
ized business units have established programs wherein "employees meet 
in small groups to discuss production and quality" (Kochan, McKersie, 
Chalykoff 1986). A 1983-1984 survey of approximately 350 unionized 
firms in Wisconsin shows that roughly 60 percent have established 
either shop-floor teams or joint committees (Voos 1987). A 1987 nation 
wide survey of approximately 150 unionized business units shows that 
about 50 percent have established "employee participation initiatives"
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(Delaney, Ichniowski, and Lewin 1988). Although these various surveys 
are not fully comparable due to differences in sampling, response rates, 
and definitions of cooperative activities, they do encompass the most 
extensive efforts to date at documentation of cooperative efforts. Taken 
together, these surveys indicate that roughly half of unionized private 
sector establishments have embarked on cooperative efforts of the 
nature to be examined by this investigation.
The fact that cooperation between unions and employers is occurring 
is (in Dunlop©s words) nothing new under the sun. Cooperative efforts to 
improve productivity and production standards were undertaken in the 
1920s and afterwards, especially in the railroad, textile, and garment 
industries (Slichter 1941; Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960; Jacoby 
1983). Pressured by the War Labor Board during WWII, unions and 
employers established thousands of joint productivity committees (de 
Schweinitz 1949). Throughout the post-WWII period, there also were a 
number of highly publicized but fairly isolated cooperative efforts 
undertaken; for example, by the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council, Rushton Coal Mine and the 
United Mine Workers, and Harmon International and the United Auto 
Workers (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960; Cammann, Lawler, 
Ledford, and Seashore 1985). History shows, however, that case after 
case of these uncommon cooperative committee and team efforts were 
short-lived.
Even though American union-management cooperative efforts de 
signed to improve company performance and labor-management rela 
tions are nothing new, the fact that these efforts are currently widespread 
is unprecedented. Were these efforts to become central and lasting 
institutional arrangements of successful collective bargaining rela 
tionships, then in the words of Kochan et al., American industrial 
relations would be transformed. For cooperative efforts to become 
lasting forms of partnership, however, it must ultimately be demon 
strated that the gains to cooperation are greater than the costs and that 
the net gains at least match those derivable from more traditional or 
highly adversarial relationships.
There is a rich descriptive literature that identifies a wide range of
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these potential benefits and costs to management, employees, and union 
leaders. The literature also identifies several general or recurring 
problems (e.g., insufficient trust and commitment) that appear to in 
crease specific costs associated with cooperation. Except for discussing 
these general problems, the literature is largely silent, nonetheless, with 
respect to identifying salient factors that affect potential benefits and 
costs, and, consequently, affect the success of cooperative efforts. One 
of the primary purposes of the present study is to begin filling that void.
Potential Benefits and Costs of Cooperation
Potential benefits and costs associated with cooperation must be 
examined through the eyes of managers, bargaining unit employees, and 
union leaders. In synthesizing the literature, therefore, I attempt to 
distinguish potential benefits and costs as they may be realized by these 
three parties to cooperative activities. Because most of these potential 
benefits and costs are fairly self-explanatory, I avoid any lengthy discus 
sion but provide interested readers with citations of reports in which 
richer descriptions and analyses can be found. The potential benefits 
and costs, as the reader will surely recognize, are sometimes extrinsic or 
pecuniary and sometimes intrinsic or nonpecuniary, some depict more 
tangible outcomes than others, and some outcomes are potential benefits 
to one or more parties but are potential costs to another.
Potential Benefits and Costs to Management
Potential Benefits: The potential benefits to management from plant- 
level cooperation reflect various dimensions of the labor costs and 
nonlabor cost components of production. Labor costs are potentially 
reduced by making the production process more efficient, increasing 
output per unit of labor, and reducing the cost of labor per unit of product 
produced. Increased product demand can be derived by improving 
product quality, giving greater attention to customer satisfaction, and 
dealing more effectively with customers. By searching out ways of 
eliminating unnecessary overhead expenditures, minimizing waste and 
rework, reducing materials costs and materials handling and inventory
Cooperation 7
costs, enhancing the utilization of capital equipment, and dealing more 
effectively with suppliers, nonlabor costs are potentially reduced. Also 
by minimizing unnecessary labor-management conflicts and problems 
and by resolving these more quickly and satisfactorily, associated lost 
productive time and inefficiencies are minimized. Last, cooperative 
efforts can potentially increase worker commitment to and identity with 
company goals, which lead to more aggressive efforts by employees and 
union leaders at being competitive and at improving workplace 
practices.
Drawing on the literature, the following potential benefits have been 
identified from a wide range and mix of cooperative efforts.
1. Increased Productivity and Efficiency
See Voos (1987); Schuster (1984, ch.6); Cohen-Rosenthal and 
Burton (1987, pp. 32-33); Rosenberg and Rosenstein (1980); 
Contino (1986); Boyle (1986); Douty (1975); Pearlstein (1988).
2.Improved Quality of Product and Service
See Camens (1986); Voos (1987); Boyle (1986); Katz, Kochan, 
and Gobeille (1983); Katz, Kochan, and Weber (1985); Smith 
(1986a).
3.Improved Customer Relations and Service 
See Mclntosh (1988).
4.Reduced Waste and Rework
See Boylston (1986); Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille (1983); Cam- 
ens (1986).
5.Reduced Overhead, Materials Costs, and Material Handling 
Costs
See Dulworth (1985); Lazes and Costanza (1984).
6.Enhanced Supplier Service
See Roadley (1988); Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1988). 
7.Improved Communications
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See Driscoll (1980); Boyle (1986); Siegel and Weinberg (1982); 
U.S. Department of Labor (1982 and 1983); Smith (1988).
8.Improved Relationships Between Supervisors and Employees
See Fuller (1981); Boyle (1986); Burck (1981,a); Kochan, Katz 
and Mower (1984, pp. 134-138).
9. Reduced Grievances and Disciplinary Action
See Guest (1979); Watts (1982); U.S. Department of Labor 
(1982); Smith (1988b).
10. Stronger Identity and Commitment to Company Goals
See Boyle (1986); Goodman (1980); U.S. Department of Labor 
(1982); Walton (1985); Verma and McKersie (1987); Schuster 
(1989).
11. Reduced Absenteeism, Tardiness, and TUrnover
See Guest (1979); Goodman (1980); Cammann, Lawler, Led- 
ford, and Seashore (1984, p. 110); Goodman and Lawler (1979); 
Siegel and Weinberg (1982).
12.Increased Organizational Flexibility and Adaptability
See Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, p. 31); U.S. Department 
of Labor (1982 and 1983); Lawler and Drexler (1978).
Potential Costs: Organizational shifts from traditional and generally 
adversarial collective bargaining relationships and autocratic manage 
rial practices (which left little room for employee or union leader 
participation in management decisions), demand substantial change in 
an organization©s culture, values, and shared ideologies. These organi 
zational shifts sometimes require sizable resources for reorientation and 
training of managers, supervisors, rank-and-file, and union represen 
tatives. The costs of change are not only financial but include non- 
pecuniary costs to many managers and supervisors in the form of 
perceived loss of authority, power, and status. Because of improvements 
in productivity and efficiency, furthermore, the perceived threat of job 
loss (attributable to shifting authority to employees) among managers
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and supervisors is heightened. In response to these potential costs, 
managers and supervisors are less inclined than otherwise to genuinely 
embrace cooperation, which necessarily reduces some of the potential 
company benefits identified above. There is also testimony that commit 
tee and team-based meetings are often marked by wasted or generally 
unproductive time, limiting management©s ability to react quickly or 
complete production schedules in a timely fashion. In addition, when 
important disputes arise, the parties sometimes make unwise compro 
mises in the name of bolstering cooperation. In summary, the literature 
has addressed the following potential costs of cooperation to 
management.
1. Added Costs for Reorientation and Training of Managers, Employ 
ees, and Union Representatives
See Tick, McKersie, and Greenblaugh (1982); Lawler and Drexler 
(1978); Siegel and Weinberg (1982); U.S. Department of Labor 
(1982); Lee (1987).
2. Perceived Loss of Authority and Status
See Lawler and Drexler (1978); Guest (1979); Schlesinger and 
Walton (1977); Rosow (1979); Jacoby (1983); Siegel and Weinberg 
(1982); Rosow (1986).
3.Displacement or Loss of Employment for Middle-Managers and 
Supervisors
See Schlesinger and Walton (1977); Simmons and Mares (1985, ch. 
13).
4. Wasted Time Spent in Meetings 
See Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1988).
Potential Benefits and Costs to Employees
Potential Benefits: Unless joint activities yield financial rewards (e.g., 
in the form of gainsharing) and greater employment security, the potential 
benefits to bargaining unit employees are largely intrinsic, as derived 
from more harmonious working relations and higher quality of work-
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lives. The literature highlights how employees derive these potential 
benefits by experiencing greater participation or involvement in their 
work, having more say in how work gets accomplished, and improving 
work conditions and environments. Assuming employees prefer more 
harmonious over less harmonious working relations, employees poten 
tially benefit from fewer grievance disputes and quicker problem resolu 
tion. Last, cooperative relationships often provide employees enhanced 
dignity, self-esteem, and pride in their work. In summary, the literature 
identifies and addresses the following potential benefits to employees:
1. Increased Intrinsic Rewards from the Participation or Involvement 
Process
See Guest (1979); Goodman (1980); Work in America Institute, 
Inc. (1982, ch. 3); Parker (1985, ch. 2).
2. Greater Say in How Work Gets Accomplished
See Kochan, Katz and Mower (1984, ch. 4). 
3.Improved Working Conditions
See U.S. Department of Labor (1983); Ruttenberg (1988).
4. Enhanced Financial Rewards From Gainsharing and Other Incen 
tive Arrangements
See Schuster (1989, 1984, ch. 6); Cummings and Molloy (1977, 
ch. 21,22); Dulworth (1985); Pearlstein (1988); Ross and Ross 
(1986).
5.Improved Supervisor-Employee Relationships
See Burck (1981,a); Fuller (1981); Boyle (1986); Kochan, Katz, 
and Mower (1984, pp. 134-138).
6. Reduced Grievances and Quicker Resolution of Problems
See Burck (198la); Kochan, Katz, and Mower (1984, pp. 
134-138); Smith (1988b).
7.Heightened Dignity, Self-Esteem, and Pride in Work
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See U.S. Department of Labor (1983); Work in America Institute, 
Inc. (1982, ch. 3); Mclntosh (1988).
Potential Costs: In some cases management may be perceived as 
promoting cooperative activities as a guise for having employees simply 
work harder as opposed to working smarter, which leads to greater 
fatigue and stress. By helping invent ways to increase productivity and 
efficiency, some employees fear displacement or loss of employment for 
themselves or co-workers. Some employees, furthermore, apparently 
fear having to relinquish their secret work practices, which would 
eliminate personal advantages in completing tasks more efficiently than 
others or in receiving pay incentives. More skilled or senior employees 
dislike sharing unwanted tasks, which is frequently required by team 
efforts. There is, finally, anecdotal evidence that some employees shun 
unwanted peer pressure to be more or less involved in cooperative 
activities. In summary, the literature identifies the following potential 
costs of cooperation to employees:
1. Working Harder, Not Necessarily Smarter 
See Oswald (1986); Simmons and Mares (1985, ch. 14).
2. Displacement or Loss of Employment From Increased Productiv 
ity and Efficiency
See Zager (1977); Schuster (1984, ch. 6); Simmons and Mares 
(1985, ch. 14); Work in America Institute, Inc. (1982, ch. 3) 
Camens (1986); Banks and Metzgar (1989).
3.Unwanted Peer Pressure to be Involved or Not Involved 
See Spector (1986).
Potential Benefits and Costs to Unions
In weighing the potential benefits and costs of joint programs, union 
leaders estimate the value of joint programs in satisfying the needs and 
promoting the interests of (a) their members, (b) the union as an 
institution, and (c) themselves as leaders. The potential benefits and 
costs to employees described above, therefore, are weighed by union
12 Cooperation
leaders. The potential benefits and costs outlined below, on the other 
hand, are pertinent to the union as a viable institution and to the leaders 
who, it can be assumed, prefer to benefit rather than be hurt politically 
by engaging in and supporting joint activities.
Potential Benefits: By satisfying member interests that would not 
otherwise be possible to satisfy except through cooperation, union 
leaders potentially receive recognition from members. The key here is, 
of course, that members reap benefits from cooperation and that they 
recognize these benefits were gotten via union leader involvement in 
establishing or modifying cooperative activities and could not have been 
gotten via traditional collective bargaining. This recognition, however, 
is sometimes thwarted by managers failing to share recognition with 
union leaders for benefits obtained. Cooperation also potentially pro 
vides union leaders with greater knowledge of and input into manage 
ment decisionmaking, which, in turn, allows the union leadership to 
make better informed decisions affecting the membership and the union 
as an institution. Cooperation, that is, potentially gives union leaders 
greater access to pertinent company information, earlier notification of 
pending organizational changes, and opportunities to persuade manage 
ment to modify their decisions.
Cooperation, in addition, potentially leads to improved communica 
tion, which (everything else the same) can lead to more harmonious 
interpersonal relations and trust between managers and union leaders. 
As an outgrowth of reduced grievances and disciplinary action, cooper 
ation reduces the conflicts and costs associated with day-to-day contract 
administration. Finally, some unions have found that the organizational 
structures surrounding joint committee and team-based activities pro 
vide avenues for more regular input by members in union activities and 
policy making. In summary, the literature identifies the following poten 
tial benefits to union leaders:
1. Recognition from Members for Improvements
See Burck (1981,a and 1981,b); Cammann, Lawler, Ledford, and 
Seashore (1984, pp. 11, 21-22); Greenberg and Glaser (1980); 
Dyer, Lipsky, and Kochan (1977).
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2. Greater Participation and Input in Management Decisions
See Fraser (1986); Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, p.20); 
Simmons and Mares (1985, ch. 14); Work in America Institute, 
Inc. (1982, ch. 4).
3. Improved Communications Between Union Leaders and Managers 
See Driscoll (1980); Smith (1988b).
4. Reduced Day-to-Day Contract Administration Problems
See Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, pp. 16-17); Kochan, 
Katz, and Mower (1984, pp. 134-146); Watts (1982).
5.Greater Membership Input into Regular Union Activities and 
Policies
See Burck (198la); Kochan, Katz, and Mower (1984, pp. 
138-146); Bieber (1984, p. 34).
Potential Costs: The adjustment from traditional adversarial roles to 
roles that embrace cooperation is just as trying and difficult (if not more 
so) for union leaders as it is for managers. One potential cost to union 
leaders is being coopted or being perceived as coopted by manage 
ment doing management©s bidding, that is, instead of protecting the 
interests of the union as an institution or its members more directly. It has 
also been reported that employers potentially use cooperative programs 
to undermine or bypass the union or its leadership in various ways: by 
appealing directly to employees for employer-initiated changes, using 
team-based efforts to alter collective bargaining agreements (e.g., with 
respect to scheduling, assignments, bidding, and job classifications); by 
usurping grievance procedures and union authority in resolving griev 
ances; and by weakening the union at the bargaining table (either by 
creating or uncovering divisions in bargaining unit preferences over 
negotiable issues).
The choice to embrace cooperation and choices about the form and 
extent of joint activities are fraught with political conflict over proper 
leadership roles. Here, dissension among leaders and the rank-and-file 
leads to increased uncertainty of reelection. Evidence also suggests that
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there can be a loss of member loyalty or commitment to the union (and, 
hence, loss of union influence) as employees begin to accept and identify 
more closely with company goals. In summary, the literature identifies 
the following potential costs:
1. Perceived Cooptation by Management
See Goodman (1980, p. 490); Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton (1987, 
pp. 17-18); U.S. Department of Labor (1982, 1983); Work in 
America Institute, Inc. (1982, ch. 4); Hoyer and Huszczo (1988); 
Strauss (1980).
2.Undermining Traditional Roles of Unions and Collective 
Bargaining
See IAM Research Report (1984, pp. 16-21); UBC Bulletin (1984, 
pp. 41-42).
3.Heightened Political Conflict Over Leadership Role
See Hammer and Stern (1986); Strauss (1980); Levine and Strauss 
(1989).
4.Increased Uncertainty of Reelection
See Hoyer and Huszczo (1988). 
5. Loss of Member Commitment and Union Influence
See Schlesinger and Walton (1977); Kochan, Katz, and Mower 
(1984, pp. 134-146); Guest (1979); Watts (1982).
Fundamental Problems Encountered
When the parties experience too much of the potential cost or too little 
of the potential benefits outlined above, problems arise. Indeed, one 
could identify a multitude of day-to-day problems and frequent crises 
encountered in cooperative activities. Most of these problems, it ap 
pears, boil down to several more fundamental problems. First, the 
literature and testimony repeatedly suggest that cooperative efforts 
between unions and employers are based on fairly uneasy or delicate
Cooperation 15
partnerships and that sufficient trust between managers and union lead 
ers must be developed over time. When sufficient trust cannot be 
developed, joint activities are limited. When trust wanes or is violated, 
joint activities likewise wane. (Schuster 1984; Rosow 1986; Kochan, 
Katz, and Mower 1984.)
Sufficient commitment by all parties to cooperative efforts is also an 
essential ingredient to any long-run success. (See Schuster 1984, pp. 
199-200; Cutcher-Gershenfield 1988; Wintergreen 1986; Kochan, 
Katz, and Mower 1984.) The stronger the commitment, the more 
intensified and diffused these cooperative activities are likely to become. 
Furthermore, trust and commitment appear to be inextricably inter 
twined. Without sufficient trust, commitment is hard to attain; and 
without sufficient commitment, high levels of trust are unobtainable.
In their survey of approximately 140 union representatives, Kochan, 
Katz, and Mower (1984) ask the extent to which "loss of union support" 
and "loss of plant management support" limit the expansion of the 
participation process. They report (see their table 5-3, p. 147) that 43 
percent of the respondents do not perceive loss of plant management 
support as a problem. About 37 percent perceive it to be somewhat of a 
problem and 20 percent perceive it to be "quite a bit" or "a very great 
deal" of a problem. With respect to loss of union support, roughly 55 
percent of the respondents report that it is not a problem, 37 percent 
report it to be somewhat of a problem, and about 20 percent report it to 
be a much more serious problem.
A third fundamental problem that arises is disenchantment and de 
moralization when anticipated or hoped-for gains are not gotten. When 
the kinds of potential benefits described above are not realized, enthusi 
asm for joint activities is known to wane (Camens 1986; Cutcher- 
Gershenfeld 1988; Kochan, Katz, and Mower 1984). Kochan, Katz, 
and Mower report that, based on their survey of union representatives, 
over 60 percent of union respondents perceive "worker disenchantment" 
as somewhat of a problem, and nearly 35 percent perceive disenchant 
ment as "quite a bit" or "a very great deal" of a problem. Only 4 percent 
respond that disenchantment among workers is not a problem. In a 
second related question, Kochan, Katz, and Mower report that 27
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percent of the union respondents find "layoffs or other employment 
cutbacks" to be somewhat of a problem, whereas 53 percent find it to be 
a more serious problem limiting the expansion of cooperative activities.
Last, some recent literature describes how many problems arise 
because of the inherent difficulty of juxtaposing or balancing coopera 
tion and more traditional collective bargaining (Bluestone 1987; Wever 
1988; Hammer and Stern 1986; Smaby et al. 1988). Alternating be 
tween traditional contract negotiations and administration of contractual 
rights via grievance, arbitration, and discipline procedures, on one 
hand, and cooperative, mutually beneficial problemsolving, on the 
other, requires a delicate balancing of two fairly distinct processes.
Although the literature addressing these fundamental problems is 
rich, it remains largely testimonial and descriptive. There appear to be 
no scientific investigations into causes of these problems or their effects 
on cooperative efforts. Nearly all the literature addressing the problems 
of distrust, insufficient commitment, and demoralization, furthermore, 
has been filtered through the views of union leaders and rank-and-file; 
the views of managers are generally missing.
Conclusions
With very few exceptions, the existing literature about American 
union-management cooperation is generally descriptive and impres 
sionistic. Although it is a rich and valuable literature, as a whole it lacks 
comparability across reports. It is piecemeal in its focus and, hence, 
lacks a broad theoretical grounding. It rarely provides any form of 
empirical testing of basic propositions or related specific hypotheses. 
The limited number of empirical investigations, furthermore, have 
largely attempted to determine whether or not joint efforts have had an 
effect on company performance and labor relations (Schuster 1983 and 
1984; Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille 1983; Katz, Kochan, and Weber 
1985; Katz, Kochan, and Keefe 1987; Voos 1987 and 1989). Although 
these empirical studies provide important evidence about outcomes 
(which are reviewed in chapter 4), they tell us very little about which
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factors or what conditions lead to more or less successful cooperative 
efforts. Finally, except through highly descriptive assessments, the 
literature also tells us little about the key factors that induce or impede 
the establishment of cooperative arrangements between unions and 
employers. In summary, our understanding of cooperation is highly 
fragmented and incomplete.
The purpose of this study is to help begin filling in some of these 
holes, first by developing more fully a general theoretical model of 
labor-management relations and the role of cooperation in these rela 
tions, and second by developing and testing general propositions and 
specific hypotheses about factors affecting decisions to cooperate and 
the outcomes of cooperative efforts. Cooperation between American 
employers and unions historically has been uncommon and short-lived; 
in a sharp break with history, it is widespread today. A far richer 
understanding of what makes cooperation work or fail is imperative, 
since without that understanding history will surely repeat itself, not 
necessarily for the right reasons.
